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Muddy Waters: Infringement Analysis
After Markman and Warner-Jenkinson
Clyde F. Willian & Joseph S. Miller *
Introduction
A patent grants aproperty interest in the classical sense: it gives its owner
the power to exclude others.' As a result, one cannot resolve any patent
infringement dispute without first marking out the "territory" over which
the patentee can exercise this power to exclude. After the scope of the patent
claim has been established, one can determine whether the accused infringer
has "trespassed" on it, i.e., practiced the invention circumscribed by the
claim.
The Federal Circuit recently summarized the accepted framework for
analyzing the question of infringement as follows:
An infringement analysis requires two separate steps. First, the court must construe the
claims asserted to be infringed as a matter oflawin order to establish their meaning and
scope. Second, the claims as construed are compared to the allegedly infringing device
or process. To literally infringe, the accused device or process must contain every
limitation ofthe asserted claim. Even ifthe accused device or process does not literally
infringe, it may infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if the differences between
the claimed invention and the accused device or process are insubstantial. 2
Of course, this method of analysis is far easier to describe than to apply.
Indeed, one cannot reliably determine whether a given product or process
* Mr. Willian is apartner in the lawfirm ofSidley &Austin, Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Miller
is an associate at Sidley &Austin and a former law derk to Judge Paul R. Michel of the U.S.
Court ofAppealsfor the Federal Circuit. This paperreflects theviews ofthe authors, notthose
of Sidley &Austin or any of its former or present clients. @1998 Clyde F. Willian &Joseph
S. Miller. All rights reserved.
' "Thepowerto excludehas traditionallybeen considered one ofthe most treasured strands
in an owner's bundle ofproperty rights." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
454 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). See aso Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) ("the essence of private property is always the right to exclude others");
Guido Calabresi &A. Douglas Melamed, Property Pies, Liability Rides, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral 85 HARv. L. Ray. 1089, 1092 (1972).
2 Texas Instruments, Inc.v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558,1563-64 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (citations and quotation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Cr. 1818 (1997).
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infringes a particular patent without referring to the extensive body of case
law that applies this analytic framework.
The last three years have made it all the more important to keep up with
case law developments on the fundamentals of infringement analysis, for we
have been cursed to live in "interesting times." Specifically, two basic
elements of the infringement analysis framework-claim construction and
the doctrine of equivalents- have undergone enormous scrutiny since early
1995. Both the Federal Circuit (sitting in banc) and the U.S. Supreme Court
have struggled with the questions whether the construction of a patent claim
presents a question of law or fact, and whether the doctrine of equivalents
infringement should survive and, if so, in what form. The question of claim
construction arose in the case now known as Markman,3 and the continued
viability of the doctrine of equivalents was the subject of the case now known
as Warner-Jenkinson.4 The courts' decisions on these fundamental questions
will continue to have a profound affect on the trial of patent cases and on the
advice we give to our clients.
We have three objectives in this paper. First, we discuss the backgrounds
of these two important cases, including the splits of authority that brought
about the need for comprehensive consideration of the issues of claim
construction and the nature of the doctrine of equivalents. Second, we
discuss the outcomes of the cases and the questions that they have answered.
Third, we discuss some of the many questions that the decisions either left
unresolved or raised themselves. Taking the issues in logical order, we first
discuss claim construction, then the doctrine of equivalents.
I Claim Construction
A. Fact or Law?
The scope of the patent claim determines the outer boundaries of the area
that the patentee can protect in an action for literal infringement. That scope
is a function of the specific terms used in the claim, and the standard rules
used to resolve disputes about the meaning of claim terms are familiar. Claim
terms have their ordinary meaning, unless it is clear from the written
description of the invention preceding the claims, known as the "specifica-
3 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), affd,
116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
4 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cit. 1996) (in
banc), rev'd in part sub nom. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997).
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tion," that the patentee intends for a given term to have a special meaning.
Indeed, the patentee's right to define his orher own claim terms is one of the
reasons that the specification must be used to construe the claim, no matter
how clear the claim appears to be on its face.5 Other claims in the same patent
should be consulted for any guidance they may provide as to the best
interpretation ofadisputed term.6 Finally, thepublicrecordoftheapplicant's
negotiations with the Patent Office, called the "prosecution history" or "file
history," can also help to determine what claim terms mean.
The goal of the claim construction process is, of course, to determinewhat
the claim means to an artisan of ordinary skill in the relevant field. Although
this presents an "objective" question, like the familiar "reasonable person"
standard in tort law, one can readily see that aparticular artisan's subjective
opinion testimony about the meaning of the claim might be helpful to the
judicial actorwho must construe the claim. Not surprisingly, expert witess
testimony has long been a regular fixture in patent infringement trials. And
this is the germ of the conflict that ultimately led to the Markman case.
As a practical matter, one can see that claim construction involves both
legal interpretation and fact finding. The patent is a legal document, like a
statute or a contract, but at the same time it is grounded in facts about a
particular technological domain. Patent interpretation, like the patent itself,
* is thus a hybrid oflawand fact, and the hybrid nature of patent interpretation
inevitably causes systemic tensions. First, we allocate decisional authority at
trial based on the law/fact distinction (juries find facts, judges declare law),
and claim construction does not fit easily into either category. Second, under
the U.S. Constitution's Seventh Amendment,7 the jury's fact-finding role
has constitutional significance. As a result, the proper allo cation of decisional
5 Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615,
621 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[W]hihnothingwithin claim 6 considered in isolation impeaches the
construction that Vitalink prefers, it is legal error to construe a claim by considering it in
isolation. A claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part.").
For example, according to an interpretive principle known as "claim differentiation," one
should avoid interpreting a term in an independent claim in a sway that makes a related
dependent claim superfluous. See, e.g.,Transmatic, Inc. v. GultonIndus., 53 F.3d 1270,1277
(Fed. Cir. 1995). In addition, a daim term must be construed the same way in each claim in
which it appears. See, e.g., CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1159 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
7 The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law.., the right to trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const., amend.
VII.
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authority over claim construction presents a constitutional question. Third,
appellate judges apply very different standards of review to findings of fact
and to conclusions of law: findings of fact are reviewed quite deferentially on
appeal and thus are rarely disturbed, whereas conclusions of law are given
plenary, or "de novo," review and thus are often modified on appeal. Again,
claim construction does not fit easily within either standard of appellate
review.
Every patent infringement case in which an expert witness plays an
important role in the claim construction phase highlights the awkwardness
of treating claim construction as a matter of law exclusively for the court. So
it should come as no surprise that, prior to theMarkman case, a fault line had
developed in the Federal Circuit's cases on claim construction's status as a
question of fact or law. Although all cases treated the "ultimate question" of
claim construction as a question of law, one line of cases treated the entirety
of the claim construction process as a question of law exclusively for the
court,8 and a conflicting line of cases treated the meaning ofa disputed claim
term as an underlying question of fact for the jury.9 In November 1993, the
Federal Circuit ordered that the Markman case be reheard in banc in order
to resolve the conflict between these two lines of authority.
B. Markman
Markman alleged that Westview's invoicing system infringed his patent
for an inventory control device capable of monitoring and reporting upon
the location of articles ofclothing in a dry cleaning or laundry establishment.
The case turned on the interpretation of the terms "report" and "inventory"
in the patent claims. At trial, Markman presented an expert witness who
testified that "report" meant "invoice," and that "inventory" meant "cash or
invoices."" The jury returned a verdict of infringement in Markman's favor,
but the district court set the verdict aside on a deferred motion for directed
'See, e.g., SSIH Equip. S.A.v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365,376 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
9See, e.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing grant
of summary judgment ofnoninfringement) ("If the language of a claim is not disputed, then
the scope of the claim may be construed as a matter of law. But when the meaning of a term
in the claim is disputed and extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain that term, then an
underlying factual question arises, and construction of the claim should be left to the trier or
jury under appropriate instruction."); McGill Inc. v. John Zink Co., 736 F.2d 666,672 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
" Markman v. Vestview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535, 1536-37 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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verdict. Concluding that claim constructionwas amatter oflaw for the court,
the trial judge rejected the definitions of key claim terms advanced by
Markman's expert witness:
These definitions are contrary to the ordinary and customary meaning ofthese terms,
as well as the obvious meaning intended by the patentee, determined from the
specifications, the drawings and the file histories of the original patent and the patent-
in-suit.... PlaintifPs technical expert's testimonyis based on an artificial interpretation
of key words and phrases .... I1
The fact of noninfringement followed readily from the claim construction
adopted by the district court, and judgment was entered in Westview
Instruments' favor.
By a vote of 8 to 3, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision. First, the court overruled prior Federal Circuit cases that treated
any aspect of claim construction as a question offact, holding that "the court
has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of
language used in the patent claim."' 2 Second, the court allowed that
"extrinsicevidence' (i.e., expertand inventor testimony, dictionaries, learned
treatises) "may be helpful to explain scientific principles, the meaning of
technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and prosecution
history,"'3 and left it within the trial court's discretion to receive these types
of evidence. The court also warned, however, that such "[e]xtrinsic evidence
is to be used for the court's understanding of the patent, not for the purpose
of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims." 4 Finally, the court
suggested that the trial court should construe the claims early on in the case,
and certainly before sending the question of infringement to the jury.5 Two
concurring opinions and one dissent criticized the majority's decision in the
strongest possible terms and on a number of fronts.
The sharp disagreement among the Federal Circuit's judges on so
fundamental a question of patent law virtually guaranteed that the U.S.
Supreme Court would agree to review the case, and it did so in mid-1995.
Turning aside Markman's claim to a Seventh Amendment right to have a
1, Id at 1537.
t"Markman, 52 F.3d at979;see also id. at 981 ("The district court's claim construction,
enlightened by such extrinsic evidence as may be helpful, is still based upon the patent and
prosecution history. It is therefore still construction, and is a matter of law subject to de novo
review.").
" Id at 930.
1 I at 98.
15 Id. at 931-32 ("the trial court ... should have instructed the jury as to the meaning of
the daims").
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jury, rather than a judge, determine the meaning of disputed terms in his
patent claims, the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision in
April 1996. According to the Supreme Court, "the construction of a patent,
including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of
the court."16 The Court determined that, as an initial matter, existing case law
did not clearly demonstrate that Markman was entitled under the Seventh
Amendment to have a jury interpret his patent claims.' 7 Next, it looked to
two practical considerations, such as the relative interpretive skills of judges
and juries and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered. Several factors
favored giving the task of claim construction to the judge: (a) judges often
construe written instruments, and so have more experience with the task than
juries; (b) even though juries historicallyhave been entrusted with credibility
determinations, a judge "is in the better position to ascertain whether an
expert's proposed definition [for a disputed claim term] fully comports with
the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent's internal
coherence"; and (c) treating claim construction as a question oflaw promotes
the necessary "uniformity in the treatment of a given patent.""s As a result,
the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision.
" Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1387.
17 Id. at 1389-93.
11 Id. at 1395-96. This "question oflaw"Iuniformity link results from the interaction of
two other features of the system. First, one court-the Federal Circuit--decides appeals from
all patent infringement case. Second, the "plenary review" standard that applies to legal
determinations allows the Federal Circuit to resolve conflicting decisions in two or more
infringement cases on the same patent in different district courts. Consider the following
hypothetical:
The patentee brings suit in two different district courts against two different infringerswho
sell identical products. One accused infringer offers a highly persuasive expert witness in favor
ofhis claim construction, and the otheraccused infringer offers a farless persuasive expert. The
jury who hears the highly reputable witness finds in favor of the accused infringer, whereas
the other jury finds in favor of the patentee. Because the accused products in the two cases are
identical, we know that the juries' inconsistent interpretations of the claim are causing the
inconsistent verdicts. Both cases are appealed. Will both verdicts be affirmed? Should both
verdicts be affirmed?
Ifthe Federal Circuitwere to review claim construction like a factual finding, both verdicts
would be affirmed. The two juries heard different evidence on the proper construction of the
claim and their respective decisions are both supported by substantial evidence. Note the
perversity of this result: the same patent claim has two mutually inconsistent meanings. If,
however, the Federal Circuit were to review claim construction like a legal determination,
subject to plenary review, one proper meaning would be determined for the claim and applied
to both cases. As a result, the claim would have the same meaning for all accused infringers.
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By emphasizing the primary importance of the patent documents them-
selves in the claim construction process, as well as the need for a single
meaning for a patent claim and the subservience of expert testimony to the
overriding goal of preserving "the patent's internal coherence,"' 9 the Su-
preme Court clearly sought to increase the predictability of patent infringe-
ment determinations. As the Court recognized in the course of itsMarkman
decision,
the limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the
encouragement of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of
the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public. Otherwise, azone ofuncertainty
which enterprise and experimentation mayenter onlyar the riskofinfringement claims
would discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the field,
and the public would be deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being
dearly told what it is that limits these rights.20
Only the passage of time will reveal whether infringement determinations
become more predictable as a result of treating claim construction as a matter
of law exclusively for the court. We can, however, already see some changes
in the wake of the Markman decisions.
C. Post-Markman Developments
1. Earlier Claim Constniction
Trial courts have started to take up the taskofclaim construction at earlier
stages of patent litigation. Prodded by the Federal Circuit's statement in
Markman that the trial court "should have instructed the jury as to the
meaning of the claims," as well as similar statements in subsequent Federal
Circuit cases, 21 district courts have shown a willingness to settle disputes
about the meaning of critical claim terms in advance of the trial itself, rather
than postponing the determination until the close of the evidence at trial.
In particular, at the request of litigants, many district courts have held
separate pre-trial "Markman hearings" to resolve disputed claim construc-
tion issues. These mini-trials on claim construction typically involve short
(e.g., one to two days) presentations by each side as to the correct meaning
11 See id at 1395 ("In the main, we expect, any credibility determinations [about the
expertswho testify in agiven patent case] will besubsumedwithin the necessarilysophisticated
analysis of the whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be
defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole.") (emphasis added).
201 d. at 1396 (internal quotations, additions, and citations omitted).
2t See, eg., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1554 (Fed. Cir.)
("The duty ofthe trial judge is to determine the meaning of the claims at issue, and to instruct
the jury accordingly."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2554 (1996).
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of the claim, as well as written and/or oral submissions from expert witnesses
and post-hearing briefing.22 On the basis of the information adduced and the
arguments made at the Markman hearing, the district court enters a decision
on claim scope. At this point, the litigants and the court can better assess
whether to proceed with the remainder of the infringement trial and, if so,
whether any given information is relevant to the remaining issues in dispute.
We can also expect more patent infringement cases to be resolved in
summary judgment proceedings. Disputed issues of fact pertaining to the
accused product or process will still require trial, but, after Markman, it is
clear beyond doubt that disputes as to the meaning of claim terms do not
require trial. As the Federal Circuit has recently held, where the only matter
genuinely in dispute is the meaning of a claim term, "the question of literal
infringement collapses to one of claim construction and is thus amenable to
summary judgment."23
2. Preliininary Injunction Proceedings
To obtain a preliminary injunction against continuing infringement, the
patentee must show, inter alia, a likelihood of success on the merits of the
infringement allegation. Of course, the likelihood of the patentee's success
is largely a function of the district court's construction of disputed claim
terms. The question arises, then, whether claim construction's status as a
matter of law would require the district court to construe the asserted claim
definitively at the preliminary injunction stage.
The arguments on both sides of the issue are straightforward. On the one
hand, since the district court must resolve other legal questions definitively
when ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction (e.g., the legal elements
of the underlying cause of action), it makes sense to require the district court
to resolve claim construction issues definitively in that same context. On the
other hand, if claim construction presents especially difficult technological
n See, e.g., Lee's Aquarium & Per Prods. v. Python Pet Prods., 951 F. Supp. 1469, 1472-
78 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (construing disputed claim terms in light of submissions at Markman
hearing); P.A.T., Co. v. Ultrak, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1506, 1511-15 (D. Kan. 1996) (same);
Huangv. Auto-Shade, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1307, 1308-09 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (describing range
ofissues that are properly before the court in aMarkman hearing); Chad Indus. v. Automation
Tooling Sys., 938 F. Supp. 601, 603-05 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (describing procedural and
substantive requirements for a proper Markman hearing).
23AthleticAlternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also
Phonometrics, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Disputes
concerning the meaning ofclaims do not preclude summary judgment, because the resolution
of those disputes is part of the process of daim interpretation, a question of law.").
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questions, and the district court wants to receive more extrinsic evidence to
hone its understanding of the underlying technology, it does not seem
improper for the court to deny a preliminary injunction on the ground that
the patentee has notshown the clearentidement that this drasticform of relief
requires.
The Federal Circuit squarely addressed this question in its March 1997
decision in International Communication Materials, Inc. v. Ricoh Company,
Ltd2 4 The district court deniedRicoh's motion for apreliminaryinjunction,
in part because, in its view, "there are substantial open issues and questions
that must be litigated before a finding of infringement can be made,
including claim interpretation."" Ricoh appealed, contending that it was
improper for the court to delay arriving at a definitive claim construction.
The Federal Circuit disagreed:
Itseems to us thatwhere adistrictcourtjudge, asin the presentcase, acknowledges that
"there are substantial open issues and questions that must be litigated" pertaining to
claim construction andhas made a determination that the movant is unlikelyto succeed
on the merits (prove infringement), our role as an appellate court, absent an abuse of
discretion, should be to provide the district judge and parties the opportunity to
complete the picture. We do not regard it as our function under these circumstances
to definitivelyconstrue claim I ofthe'603 patent, orto review asiffrom final judgment
the district court's tentative construction without the more complete record that the
district court deemed necessary to its own final decision.26
In other words, district courts are permitted to arrive at and act upon a
"tentative construction" of the claim.
The Federal Circuit's reasoning in the Ricoh case raises the interesting
possibility ofa claim construction that changes over the life ofthe patentsuit.
Consider the following scenario: A district court grants a patentee's motion
for a preliminary injunction on the basis of a tentative claim construction.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit sustains that preliminary injunction and, by
inference, the tentative claim construction. Later, as the litigation proceeds,
the district court no longer adheres to that tentative claim construction, but
instead definitively construes the claim in away that precludes infringement
and enters judgment in the defendant's favor. Will this judgment also be
affirmed on appeal? It may or may not be, depending on whether the Federal
Circuit agrees with the district court's definitive claim construction. In any
event, under the logic of Ricoh, the fact that the Federal Circuit sustained the
preliminary injunction against the accused infringer is not a "law of the case"
24 108 F.3d 316 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
25 Id at 313 (quoting district court's decision).
21 rd at 318-19.
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that would preclude judgment in the defendant's favor on the basic question
of infringement.
Ramifications of the Markman decision, such as the one explored in the
Ricoh case, will no doubt occupy the Federal Circuit for some time to come.
3. Canons of Claim Construction
As we noted above, in Markman both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court emphasized the patent's status as a legal document in deciding to leave
its construction entirely to the trial judge. Indeed, the Federal Circuit went
so far as to make an extended comparison between a patent and a statute:
Statutes, like patents, are enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements
between contracting parties. When interpreting statutes, a court looks to the language
of the statute and construes it according to the traditional tools of statutory construc-
tion, including certain well known canons of construction. A court may also find it
necessary to review the legislative history of the statute, which is itselfa matter ofpublic
record, just as the specification and prosecution history of a patent are public records.
While a court may seek from the public record to ascertain the collective intent of
Congress when it interprets a statute, the subjective intent of any particular person
involved in the legislative process is not determinative .... Similarly, the subjective
meaning that a patentee may ascribe to claim language is also not determinative. Thus,
it is from the public record that a court should seek in a patent infringement case to find
the meaning of claim language.27
The court's analogy reinforces the principle established earlier in its opinion,
and echoed by the Supreme Court, that patent claims must be construed
primarily by reference to the public patent record that is available to
everyone, rather than by reference to the testimony of an expert who is
unknown before the trial, or the self-serving testimony of the inventor.2
Under this document-focused regime, general canons of claim construction
are likely to play an increasingly important role.
New canons of claim construction have begun to appear in the Federal
Circuit's decisions. For example, two cases from 1996 follow a rule akin to
contraproferentum, according to which an ambiguous contract provision is
11 Markman, 52 F.3d at 987 (internal citations omitted).
2 Id. at 981 ("Extrinsic evidence is to be used for the court's understanding of the patent,
not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claims."); see also Markman,
116 S. Ct. at 1395 (an expert's testimony must "fully comportl with the specification and
claims and [thus] preserve the patent's internal coherence"); Bell & Howell Document
Management Prods. v.AltekSys., 132 F.3d701, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1038 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("Patents should be interpreted on the basis of their intrinsic record, not on the
testimony of such after-the-fact 'experts' that played no part in the creation and prosecution
of the patent.").
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construed against the drafter.29 In Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg.,
Inc.,30 the first such decision, the court exhaustively analyzed the claim
language, the written description of the invention, and the patent's prosecu-
tion history. It concluded that "[nleither the claim, the specification, nor the
prosecution history establishe[d] the meaning of the" disputed phrase. To
break the tie between the equally plausible claim interpretations with which
it was confronted, the court took guidance from the public notice function
embodied by the requirement, found at 35 U.S.C. § 112, 5 2, that the
patentee particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention. According
to the Federal Circuit, "[w]here there is an equal choice between a broader
and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that
indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower
meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by
adopting the narrower meaning."31
The Athletic Alternatives rule has been applied again in at least one
subsequent Federal Circuit case, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States
Surgical Corp.32 In Ethicon, the court construed the disputed claim narrowly
on the ground that "a patent claim may be interpreted only as broadly as its
unambiguous scope," citing Athletic Alternatives.33 Other canons of claim
construction are sure to follow.
4. The Changing Role of the Expert Witness
In Markman, the Supreme Court acknowledged that claim construction
has been, and will remain, "a mongrel practice."34 It involves both law and
fact. Giving all aspects of claim construction to the courts probably has
increased the predictability of patent infringement determinations, at least
as to literal infringement, because judges are at least marginally (if not
significantly) more likely than jurors to accord primary importance to the
publicly available patent record.
Of course, no amount ofjudicial control over claim construction, and no
amount of aspiration for a process that resolves claim construction disputes
entirely on the basis of the paper record, can remove the expert witness from
the courtroom. Why not? Because, at a minimum, generalist judges will
29 See, e.g., Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706,714-15 (7th Cir. 1985).
30 73 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
31 ara at 1581.
32 93 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
33 I. at 1581. See also id ("[To the extent that the claim is ambiguous, a narrow reading
which excludes the ambiguously covered subject matter must be adopted.").
34 Markman, 116 S. Cr. at 1390.
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continue to require tutorials on the dizzying array oftechnologies that patent
cases bring before them. Indeed, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
agreed, in their respective decisions in Markman, that a district court enjoys
broad discretion to receive evidence extrinsic to the patent documents if
doing so will help it to better construe the disputed claim terms.5
And so the fact/law tension at the heart of claim construction that
predated Markman, and that helped to cause the split in authority that
brought about the need for Markman, has remained. On the one hand, the
patent record is the primary and determinative source of a claim term's
meaning. On the other hand, the final arbiter of the claim term's meaning-
a district court judge, or a panel ofFederal Circuit judges--can rely on expert
testimony and other extrinsic evidence as much as is necessary, so long as the
hazy boundary between "understanding the patent" technologyand "varying
or contradicting claim terms" is not crossed. 6
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit continues to grapple with the proper
use of expert testimony at the claim construction phase, and to police the
boundary between "understanding the patent" and "varying or contradicting
claim terms." In Markman itself, the Federal Circuit approved of the district
court's rejection of the expert testimony that the patentee offered in his
behalf. The district court found the expert testimony "artificial" and at odds
with the documentary record, and the Federal Circuit agreed.17 The Supreme
Court endorsed this approach by emphasizing the subservience of expert
testimony to the primary goal of preserving "the patent's internal coher-
ence."
38
The Federal Circuit has further elaborated on the proper and improper
uses of expert testimony in its decisions. For example, in Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc.,39 a case involving a method for soldering devices to a
printed circuit board, infringement turned on the proper meaning of the
phrase "solder reflow temperature." Specifically, the patentee contended that
"solder reflow temperature" should be construed as "peak reflow tempera-
ture" (i.e., the temperature at which the solder is completely melted and
35 Such extrinsic evidence could include the testimony ofexperts (induding the inventor),
treatises, and technical and regular dictionaries. In addition, the district court has complete
discretion as to the weight, if any, to be given such extrinsic evidence.
3 Markman, 52 F.3d at 981 ("Extrinsic evidence is to be used for the court's understanding
of the patent, not for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of the claim.").
37 The Supreme Court did not express any view on the particulars of the expert testimony
in the case, having granted review on the Seventh Amendment jury right question alone.
3 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
39 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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moves freely), whereas the accused infringer contended that the "solder
reflow temperature" should be construed as the "liquidus temperature" (i.e.,
the temperature at which the solder begins to melt).40 The patentee relied on
the specification, which expressly and carefully distinguished reflow from
liquidus temperature. The accused infringer countered with extrinsic evi-
dence, including the testimony ofan expert witness, tending to show that in
some contexts (i.e., other than the specification) reflowand liquidus tempera-
ture were used interchangeably. Reversing the district court's decision in
favor of the accused infringer, the Federal Circuit commented on the proper
use of such extrinsic evidence:
The claims, specification, and filehistory, ratherthan extrinsic evidence, constitute the
public record of the patentee's claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely.
In other words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the
established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed
invention and, thus, design around the claimed invention. Allowing the public record
to be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert
testimony, would make this right meaningless.... [E]xpert testimony tending to show
that those skilled in the artwould, in certain circumstances, understand "solder reflow
temperature" to mean the solder liquidus temperature is entitled to no weight in light
of the dear contrary meaning shown in the specification. Because the specification
dearly and unambiguously defined the disputed term in the claim, reliance on this
extrinsic evidence was unnecessary and, hence, legally incorrect.41
Throughout its analysis, the court emphasized the importance of using the
public patent documents as the alpha and omega of claim construction.
Some subsequent Federal Circui t and district cour 3 decisions have
remained true to this approach.
40 Id at 1580.
41 Id at 1583-85 (internal citations omitted); see also id at 1585 ("Indeed, opinion
testimony on claim construction should be treated with the utmost caution, for it is no better
than opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms.").
4'See, e.g., 0.1. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576,1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[We
conclude that one skilled in the art reading the claims, description, and prosecution history
would conclude that the term 'passage' in claim 17 does not encompass a smooth-walled,
completely cylindrical structure. Because the [written] description adequately explains the
meaning of 'passage' as used in this patent, we need not consider extrinsic evidence.) (citing
Vitronics) (emphasis added); Bell & Howell 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038 ("any expert
testimony that is inconsistent with unambiguous intrinsic evidence should be accorded no
weight").
43See, e.g., PAT., Co.v. Ultrak, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1506,1511 (D. Kan. 1996) ("Extrinsic
evidence cannot be used to explain ambiguity in claim terminology or to vary the claim
terms.") (citing Varonics).
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When combined with the canon of claim construction established in
Athletic Alternatives and Ethicon, according to which ambiguities in claim
scope are construed against the patentee (i.e., against a finding of infringe-
ment), the Markmanl Vitronics approach establishes a powerful framework
for reliably analyzing any infringement question. The framework is as
follows:
A. Review the claims (asserted and nonasserted), the written description
of the invention preceding it, and the prosecution history to determine
whether the disputed term has a clear definition to one ofordinaryskill
in the relevant art.
B. If the term is clearly defined, apply that definition.
C. If the term is not clearly defined, adopt whichever one of the compet-
ing interpretations results in a claim of narrower scope (i.e., gives the
patentee a smaller area from which to exclude others).
Under this regime, the only use that a trial court can properly make of
expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence is to improve its general
background understanding of the technology at issue. In addition, because
the proper use of extrinsic evidence is carefully constrained, the trial court's
discretion to admit such evidence should not undermine the predictability
of outcomes that both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court sought to
enhance in the Markman decisions.
Sadly, some post-Markman decisions stray from this predictability-
enhancing methodology. For example, in Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP
Chemicals Ltd," a case authored by the Markman dissenter in March 1996
(prior to both the Supreme Court's affirmance of Markman and the Federal
Circuit's decision in Vitronics), the court affirmed a jury verdict in the
patentee's favor on the basis of the named inventor's testimony. The patent
documents did not clearly favor one of the parties' competing definitions
over the other, and both parties presented dictionary definitions that
supported their respective interpretations of the claim, as well as testimony
from technical experts. To break the tie between the competing definitions,
the court relied on the testimony of the named inventor of the patent, noting
that the district court had found him "highly credible" and indicating that
his testimony enhanced the panel's understanding of "the usage of the
disputed terms." 5 The court's approach in Hoechst sharply contrasts both
with Vitronics and Markman, which treat self-serving inventor testimony
78 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Cr. 275 (1996).
45 Id. at 1580.
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with the utmost suspicion, and with AtheticAlternatives and Ethicon, which
require the court to construe ambiguities in claim scope against, not in favor
of, the patentee. Those who advocate for a more predictable method of
infringement analysis can only hope that Hoechst, authored during the
transition before theSupreme CourtaffirmedMarkman, remainsan anomaly.
5. The Future of Claim Construction
The professed goal of both Markman decisions is to make infringement
analysis more predictable and reliable. To help realize this goal, both the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court drew a distinction between using
extrinsic evidence to learn more about the technology"at issue and using it to
resolve the choice between competing constructions of a disputed claim
term. In decisions like Vitronics, the Federal Circuit continues to clarify and
to police this hazyboundarybetween "understanding thepatent" technology
and "varying or contradicting claim terms." Without such continued
elab oration andvigorous policing, the unconstrained discretion thatMarkman
gives to trial judges to receive as much or as little extrinsic evidence as they
like, and to give anypiece ofthat testimonyas much oras littleweightas they
like, maywell undermine the predictability thatMarkman sought to achieve.
In otherwords, to allow the trial court the unfettered discretion to receive and
rely on evidence outside the patent documents without strictly policing the
substantive use to which the court puts it destabilizes infringement analysis,
rewarding the patentee who inartfully drafts his claims with an opportunity
at trial to reframe his claims (with the help ofa persuasive "hired gun" expert)
after his patent has issued and he has the benefit of access to his competitor's
product.
Although decisions such as Vitronics and Ethicon suggest that the Federal
Circuit is serious about requiring district courts to construe claims by
exhausting the guidance that the patent documents themselves provide,
rather than simply picking the more persuasive of two competing experts,
conflicting decisions such as Hoechst Celanese are already in the reports.
Unless thejudges of the Federal Circuit continue to enforce the mandate and
the goal of Markman consistently and vigorously in the years to come, any
gains in predictability Will be fleeting and the elimination ofjuries from the
claim construction process will have been for naught.
H. The Doctrine of Equivalents
A. Claims and Equivalents: A Doomed Alliance?
Our courts have applied the doctrine ofequivalents since the era ofthefirst
patent statute. Justice Story, riding circuit, observed that "[mlere colorable
differences, or slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the original
inventor." 6 The Supreme Court first endorsed the doctrine in 1854, in
Winans v. Denmead,47 and reaffirmed its viability a century later, in Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products.8
But the doctrine of equivalents, despite its excellent pedigree, has never
been free from controversy. Winans and Graver Tank were both split
decisions, with sharp dissents complaining that the doctrine of equivalents
injects uncertainties into infringement analysis that would harm the long-
term health of the market for technological innovation.49 The underlying
problem has always been the same: namely, how does one adequately protect
the patentee from an infringer who trespasses on the "spirit" (if not the letter)
of the claimed invention, while at the same time giving the public adequate
notice of the scope of the claimed invention so that it can reliably design
around the claimed invention and/or avoid infringement liability? Rather
than sacrifice one of these two goals-full protection for the patentee, to the
other-adequate public notice of the scope of patent protection, the courts
, Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1314) (No. 10,432).
7 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1854).
Is 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
4 In Winans, the patent in suit covered a cylindrical railroad car with a cone-shaped
bottom, whereas the accused railroad car was octagonal with an octagonal bottom. 56 U.S.
at 338-39. The circuit court had held that, as a matter oflaw, there could be no infringement,
and the Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 5 to 4. According to the Court, "[tlhere was
evidence tending to prove that, considered in reference to the practical uses of such a car, the
octagonal car was substantially the same as the circular." Id. at 340. In essence, the Court
concluded that it would be unfair to limit patent protection to cover literal infringements
alone. Id. at 341-44. The dissent concluded that such expansive protection for the patentee
was contrary to the Patent Act's requirements of an enabling disclosure and of claims that
"particularly 'specify and point' out" the invention. Ido at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting). In
addition, the dissent predicted that the doctrine of equivalents would be "mischievous" and
lead to "oppressive and costly litigation" and "vexatious demands" on the part of patentees.
Id.
In Graver Tank, the patent in suit covered welding compositions containing magnesium
silicate, whereas the accused welding composition replaced magnesium silicate with manga-
nese silicate. 339 U.S. at 610. The district court found infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, which finding the circuit court of appeals sustained. The Supreme Court, by a
vote of 6 to 2, also affirmed the district court's judgment, adhering to the doctrine of
equivalents. Id at 607-12. In dissentJustice Blackcomplained, as did the dissenters in Winans
before him, that the doctrine could not be squared with the requirements of the Patent Act
or with the business community's need for a predictable method ofdetermining infringement
without resort to litigation. Id. at 612-13.
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have struck a balance between them: the patentee can recover against those
whose activities are "beyond any permissible interpretation of the claim
language,"5 but only ifthe departure beyond the scope of the claim language
is "insubstantial."5' This balance is, at best, precarious.
Implementing the doctrine of equivalents has caused its share of trouble
for the Federal Circuit over the years. In the mid-1980s, the court became
divided over whether infringement under the doctrine ofequivalents should
be assessed by comparing the claimed invention as a whole to the accused
product or process as a whole, or rather by determining whether every claim
limitation is met literally orbyan equivalent.52 In 1987, the Federal Circuit,
sitting in bancin the Pennwaltcase,5 resolved this controversy in favor of the
"limitation bylimitation" approach, now known as the "all limitations rule."
Similarly, in the early and mid-1990s, the court became divided over
whether the doctrine of equivalents is a truly equitable doctrine, available
only after a showing of some bad faith conduct on the accused infringer's
part, or instead was available to every patentee who could show that the
accused product or process differed only insubstantially from the claimed
product or process. The doctrine had, of course, long been acknowledged as
away to provide patentees the full measure of protection for their inventions,
and was thus a matter of fairness to all patentees. But the Federal Circuit
began to suggest that the doctrine was truly equitable, like injunctive relief,
and warned that its application should be "the exception [and] not the
rule. ' 54 Indeed, some lower courts took the bait, imposing an equitable
threshold test before permitting a patentee to assert infringement by equiva-
lents.55 As the "invention as a whole"/"all limitations rule" controversy
5
"Wilson Sporting Goods Co.v. David Geoffrey &Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,684 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990).
51 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
5 
2 CompareMartinv. Barber,755 F.2d 1564,1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (applying"asawhole"
standard) with Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532-33
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying "limitation by limitation" standard).
5 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935-36 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in
banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988), andcert denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
5' Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Londonv. Carson PirieScott&Co., 946F.2d 1534,1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). ContraSeymour
v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (I I Wall.) 516, 556 (1871) ("Patentees... are entitled in all cases to
invoke to some extent the doctrine of equivalents .... ).
5 See, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555
(Fed. Cir.) (stating that the Commission had applied an equitable threshold test), cert. denied,
116 S. Cr. 2523 (1996).
receded into the past, the "equitable threshold"/"every case" controversy
took its place, and this latter controversy stood at the center of the Warner-
Jenkinson case.
B. Warner-Jenkinson
Hilton Davis alleged that Warner-Jenkinson infringed its '746 patent,
directed to a process for purifying dye solutions by "ultrafiltration" through
porous membranes at specified pressures, pore diameters, and pH levels.
Claim 1 of the '746 patent, the only independent claim asserted in the case,
was limited to aprocess conducted at "a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0."51
Warner-Jenkinson's process, unlike the claimed process, operated at a pH of
5.0; prior to trial, Hilton Davis thus conceded that there was no literal
infringement, and proceeded solely on a doctrine of equivalents theory.17
The jury found in Hilton Davis' favor. The district court denied Warner-
Jenkinson's motion for a post-verdict judgment of noninfringement as a
matter of law, and a sharply divided Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment
ofinfringement. 5 Bya 7-5 vote, the Federal Circuit held that (a) the doctrine
of equivalents is a legal (notan equitable) doctrine available to every patentee
who can show that the accused product or process meets every limitation of
the claim either literally or by an equivalent, (b) the question of equivalency
is one of fact for the jury (if properly demanded), and (c) the proper standard
for equivalency is "insubstantial differences," one measure of which is the
familiar tripartite "function/way/result" test from Graver Tank.5" In doing
so, the court expressly rejected Warner-Jenkinson's contention that the
Patent Act of 1952, and particularly its provision for "means-plus-function"
claims, abrogated the doctrine.6" Finally, on the particular facts of the case,
the court concluded that Hilton Davis had successfully proved infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents according to the proper standards.
One of the defenses the Federal Circuit rejected in affirming the judgment
in Hilton Davis' favor was prosecution history estoppel. This constraint on
the doctrine prevents the patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents to
recapture coverage that was relinquished during prosecution of the patent.61
" Hilton Davis Chem Co.v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,1515 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(en banc).
57 Id. at 1516.
" Id. at 1515-16.
"Id. at 1516-22.
Id at 1525-27.
' See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 951-52 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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Itwas undisputed that Hilton-Davis had added the "pH from approximately
6.0 to 9.0" limitation to claim 1 during prosecution in order to overcome a
prior art rejection based on a patented process operating at pH levels above
9.0.62 Warner-Jenkinson contended that this claim amendment should estop
Hilton Davis from assertingequivalentinfringement, but the Federal Circuit
disagreed. Because the prior art involved pH levels above 9 only, and did not
address pH levels below 6, the court concluded that the "amendment
surrendered pHs above 9, but does not bar Hilton Davis from asserting
equivalency to processes such as Warner-Jenkinson's operatingsometimes at
a pH below 6."'3
On March 3, 1997, in a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed
part of the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed only one aspect of the
Federal Circuit's decision, using the case to create a new presumption of
prosecution history estoppel that applies whenever the patentee cannot
explain the reason for a claim amendment made during prosecution.
According to the Court, in its prior decisions on the question, "prosecution
history estoppel was tied to amendments made to avoid the prior art, or
otherwise to address aspecific concern-such as obviousness-that arguably
would have rendered the claimed subject matter unpatentable." 65 In the case
at bar, however, the prior art rejection explained only the upper bound of9.0
included in the amendment, and not the lower bound of6.0. The Court was
thus confronted with the choice between two default rules regarding unex-
plai(a) unexplained amendments run in favor of the
patentee, i.e., do not create an estoppel; or (b) unexplained amendments run
in favor of the accused infringer, i.e., do create an estoppel. Out of"deference
to the role of claims in defining an invention and providing public notice,"
the Court chose the latter rule:
Mindful thatclaims do indeedserveboth adefinitional and anotice function, we think
the better rule is to place the burden on the patent-holder to establish the reason for
an amendment required during patent prosecution. [66] The court then would decide
whether that reason is sufficient to overcome prosecution history estoppel as a bar to
Ia Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1515-16.
3 Id. at 1525.
(4 Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1054 (1997).
5 d. at 1049.
", Note that this is the very same justification the Federal Circuit gave in Athletic
Alternativesforits decision to construe ambiguities in claim scope against thepatentee.Athetic
Alternative, 73 F.3d at 1581. In this regard, the Supreme Court's decision confirms the
correctness of the canon of claim construction adopted in AthleticAlternatives.
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application of the doctrine of equivalents to the element added by that amendment.
Where no explanation is established, however, the court should presume that the PTO
had a substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting element
added by amendment. In those circumstances, prosecution history estoppel would bar
the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.67
Because the Federal Circuit had effectively followed the opposite rule, letting
the Hilton Davis' unexplained addition of the lower bound of 6.0 to the
claim run in the patentee's favor, the Supreme Court reversed this aspect of
the decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on this point.
The Supreme Court shared the Federal Circuit's views on the remaining
questions presented. First, the Court rejected the contention that the
doctrine of equivalents was abrogated by the 1952 Patent Act. 3 Second, the
Court endorsed the strictest adherence to the "all limitations rule," holding
that "the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of
the claim, and not to the invention as a whole," and that "the doctrine, even
as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety."6' 9 Third, the Court concluded that the
doctrine of equivalents is a legal, not an equitable, doctrine available to every
patentee.7 Fourth, the Court endorsed the Federal Circuit's conclusion that
the proper time for assessing equivalency "is at the time of infringement, not
at the time the patent was issued."7' Fifth, and finally, the Court left it to the
Federal Circuit to craft the proper test of the fact of equivalency, indicating
that "[d]ifferent linguistic frameworks [i.e., "insubstantial difference" versus
"function/way/resul'] may be more suitable to different cases, depending on
their particular facts." 72 In short, nearly all aspects of the Federal Circuit's
decision in the case remain intact.
I7 Warner-Jenkinson, 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
"' Id. at 1047-48 ("Absent something more compelling than the dubious negative
inference offered by petitioner, the lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly
supports adherence to our refusal in Graver Tank to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that
doctrine. Congress can legislate the doctrine ofequivalents out ofexistence anytime it chooses.
The various policy arguments now made by both sides are thus best addressed to Congress,
not this Court.").
(9 Id. at 1049; see also id. at 1054 (requiring a "focus on individual elements and a special
vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to eliminate completely any such
elements"), 1054 n.8 ("if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim
element ... judgment should be rendered by the court").
70 Id. at 1051-52.
7, Id. at 1052-53.
7 Id. at 1554.
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One point regarding the Supreme Court's decision remains. Because the
Court reversed the Federal Circuit's decision insofar as it held in the
patentee's favor on the legal limitation of prosecution history estoppel, the
case no longer properlypresented the questionwhether assessing equivalency
is a task for the judge or the jury. As a result, the Supreme Court's decision
does not speak conclusively to this issue. The Court did, however, make two
important observations on the matter: first, the Court noted that "[t] herewas
ample support in [its] prior cases for" the Federal Circuit's holding that the
question of equivalents is one of technological fact for the jury; second, the
Court expressly stated that "[n]othing in [its] recent Markman decision
necessitates a different result than that reached by the Federal Circuit."73 As
with the proper test for equivalency, the Court effectively left the question
in the Federal Circuit's hands.
C. Post-Warner-Jenkinson Developments
The Supreme Court decided Warner-Jenkinson only recently, and it is
thus too early to obtain a reliable or detailed sense of how the lower courts,
including the Federal Circuit, will implement the new presumption of
prosecution history estoppel announced by the Supreme Court. We can,
however, report a number of developments.
First, in the wake of Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court vacated three
other Federal Circuit decisions and remanded them to that court for further
consideration in light of Warner-Jenkinson. Two of the cases involve the "all
limitations rule" problem, and the third, like Warner-Jenkinson itself,
involves an unexplained claim amendment.7 Atpresenr, no remand decision
has yet been rendered in any of these cases. The Federal Circuitwill thus have
multiple opportunities, in these cases and in others, to applyand to elaborate
upon critical aspects of the Supreme Court's decision in the future.
Second, the Federal Circuit has already acted on the remanded Warner-
Jenkinson decision itself. On June 12, 1997, the Federal Circuit, acting in
banc, issued an order remanding the case to the district court for further
development of the record. Specifically, the court "remand[ed] th[e] case to
the district court to conduct an inquiry to ascertain whether Hilton Davis can
73 Id at 1053.
74The threevacated decisions are as follows: Litton Sys. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559
(Fed. Cir. 1996) ("all limitations rule" problem highlighted in Judge Bryson's dissent);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("all limitations rule"
problem highlighted in Judge Nies' dissent); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (unexplained claim amendment).
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rebut the presumption by showing the reason for" its addition of the lower
bound of a pH of 6 to the claim, leaving it to the district court's discretion
"to decide whether hearings are necessary or whether the issue can adequately
be determined on a written record." 75 In addition, the court reconsidered its
decision in light of the Supreme Court's insistence that the "all limitations
rule" be applied rigorously, concluding that the judgment in Hilton Davis'
favor does not "vitiate" the "pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0" claim
limitation.
76
Third, on March 7, 1997, four days after the Supreme Court's Warner-
Jenkinson decision, the Federal Circuit announced its decision in Tanabe
Seiyaku Co. v. United States International Trade Commission.17 In that
decision, the Federal Circuit adhered to its views that equivalency is
determined according to the "insubstantial differences" standard" and that
the question of equivalent infringement is one of fact for the factfinder, not
the court,79 acknowledging in both instances that the Supreme Court had left
these questions to the Federal Circuit.
What more does the future hold for the doctrine of equivalents? Again, it
is too soon to tell. Many issues have been resolved. The doctrine is alive and
well, if a little narrower in scope. The courts have been cautioned not to let
the doctrine run roughshod over claim limitations, and the new presumption
ofprosecution history estoppel, however it is implemented, shifts the balance
in favor of accused infringers. We know, however, that far more remains to
be said regarding the proper way to implement the Federal Circuit's
"insubstantial differences" standard for assessing the technological fact of
equivalency. We also know that the full force of the "all limitations rule" is
uncertain, but that it could well emerge as an increasingly significant
constraint on the ability of patentees to proceed under the doctrine of
equivalents.8 0 In short, we have no choice but to watch closely for these
developments and to remain alert for many others that we cannot now
predict.
" Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (in banc).
71 Id. at 1163-64.
' 109 F.3d 726 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 624 (1997).
71 Id- at 729.
7Id. at 731.
' For a recent and exceptionally robust application of the "all limitations rule," see Sage
Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Conclusion
Intellectual property lawyers know that it is a difficult task to determine
with a high confidence level whether a product or process infringes a given
patent. IntheMarkman and Warner-Jenkinson cases, the courts havewresded
with fundamental questions about core components of the framework for
analyzing infringement. They have done so in an effort to reconcile conflict-
ing lines of authority and resolve tensions between different parts of the
framework. By clarifying some aspects of the law, the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court have probably made it marginally easier to confidently
predict the outcome of a patent infringement trial. But only the passage of
time, and the resolution of many more cases applyingMarkman and Warner-
Jenkinson, will reveal the full measure of their success.

